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Abstract
The paper analyses the efficiency of extension programs in the adoption of chemical
fertilisers in Ethiopia between 1994 and 2004. Fertiliser adoption provides a suitable
strategy to ensure and stabilize food production in remote vulnerable areas. Extension
services programs have a long history in supporting the application of fertiliser. How-
ever, their efficiency is questioned. In our analysis, we focus on seven villages with a
considerable time lag in fertiliser diffusion. Using matching techniques avoids sample
selection bias in the comparison of treated (households received extension service) and
controlled households. Additionally to common factors, measures of culture, proxied
by ethnicity and religion, aim to control for potential tensions between extension agents
and peasants that hamper the efficiency of the program. We find a considerable impact
of extension service on the first fertiliser adoption. The impact is consistent for five of
seven villages.
Keywords: Adoption, Extension Service, Culture, Matching Frontier, Ethiopia
1 Introduction
The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger plays an essential role for the development
of Sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations, 2014). The Ethiopian strategy, to promote proper
nutrition and stable food supply, builds on large investments in the agricultural sector in
order to spur labour productivity (Rashid et al., 2013). Current figures indicate the success
of that policy (Dorosh and Rashid, 2013). Despite the fact that Ethiopia was placed under
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1 Introduction
the alarming hunger category by the Global Hunger Index1, it was able as a nation to meet
the MDG’s hunger target (FAO et al., 2014) and to cut the relative and absolute size of its
starving population (UN-OHRLLS, 2014). Since the beginning of the 1990s, annual fertiliser
consumption grew from 140,000 tons up to 650,000 tons in 2012 (Rashid et al., 2013) and
fertiliser usage increased by 180 percent between 1993 and 2005 (UNDP, 2010). The main
channel to promote fertiliser usage in rural areas are extension service programmes (Byerlee
et al., 2007). These programmes aim to support the application of modern inputs like
fertiliser or improved seeds and also teach new agricultural practices or serve as a source of
credit for agricultural equipment. However, their efficiency is questioned by the literature as
application rates remain low (Byerlee et al., 2007; Kassie et al., 2009; Spielman et al., 2011),
resulting, in large stocks due to an excess supply of fertiliser (Abrar et al., 2004; Rashid
et al., 2013).
Therefore, the paper aims to contribute to the discussion about the effectiveness of ex-
tension service programmes. Recent literature by Krishnan and Patnam (2014) and Nisrane
et al. (2011) found large positive impacts of extension service on fertiliser adoption and agri-
cultural output between 1994 and 2004 but rarely any impact after 2004. We confirm the
results of Krishnan and Patnam (2014) and observe a notable positive impact of extension
service on fertiliser adoption between 1994 and 20042. Unlike previous works on the topic, we
use the pure definition of adoption and focus only on households without prior knowledge
of fertiliser usage. The underlying justification lies in the recurrent necessity of fertiliser
usage. Since the decision to use fertiliser occurs repeatedly, previous personal experience of
households influences the repeated decision after the initial adoption. Hence, the observed
diminishing impact of extension service as source of information on fertiliser usage after 2004
may be attributed to its redundancy as the vast majority of households has already applied
fertiliser at least once and does not require further extensions service but, instead, relies on
close neighbours for knowledge exchange and for a discussion regarding continued usage, as
1The Global Hunger Index combines undernourishment, child underweight and child mortality as equally
weighted indicators (IFPRI, 2014).
2In contrast to Krishnan and Patnam (2014), we lack the necessary information regarding extension
service participation between 2004 and 2009.
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shown by Krishnan and Patnam (2014). Our analysis identifies the effect of extension service
on first adopters and provides evidence for the importance of the programme in areas where
fertiliser had not previously been used. Thus, we measure the pure effect of extension service
and investigate whether extension agents fulfil their intended function of raising awareness
about the technology and spurring diffusion. In addition, the study highlights potential
obstacles to the performance of development agents from a cultural vantage point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the his-
tory of extension programmes in Ethiopia and the discussion about the efficiency of such
programmes. Section 3 presents the data selected from the Ethiopia Rural Household Sur-
vey (ERHS) and investigate determinants of late bloomers. Section 4 describes the matching
technique applied to analyse the impact of extension services on fertiliser adoption. Section 5
presents the results and discusses the robustness and heterogeneity of the effect. Finally,
Section 6 closes the paper with a summary and an outlook for further research.
2 Extension service in Ethiopia
Soil degeneration, erosion and deforestation are common problems in Ethiopia and com-
plicate a sufficient food supply for the growing population. In addition, current farming
practices and technologies are outdated and agricultural productivity lags far behind (Diao
et al., 2007; AGRA, 2014). A potential solution to foster agricultural productivity is seen
in the promotion of extension service programmes. These development programmes aim
to provide information and awareness of modern technologies and suitable practices. They
aim to close knowledge gaps between farmers and research in order to increase yields and
exploit the agricultural potential to ensure sustainable food production. Positive examples
of functioning extension services can be found worldwide, e.g., Pakistan (Ali and Rahut,
2013), Uruguay (Maffioli et al., 2013) or Nigeria (Fabiyi, 2015) amongst others.
In Ethiopia, agricultural extension service programmes first occurred in the 1950th
(Kassa, 2003). Since then, programmes with different design and scope like the Minimum
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Package Project I& II (from 1971 to 1974 and 1981 to 1985) or the Peasant Agriculture
Development Extension Programme (PADEP, launched in 1985) have been in place (Kassa,
2003; Kassa and Abebaw, 2004). These programmes have been generally inefficient due to
their top-down approach and the non participatory nature (Kassa, 2003; Mossie and Meseret,
2015). More recent approaches like Sakawa Global 2000 (SG2000, 1993) or the participa-
tory demonstration and training extension system (PADETES, 1995) aimed to resolve these
shortcomings. However, evaluation results are mixed. While Bonger et al. (2004) or Spiel-
man et al. (2011) find hardly any positive impacts for income and production, Dercon et al.
(2009) attributes a decrease of 9.8 percentage points in poverty to the work of the extension
agents. With respect to the use of new technologies, Kassie et al. (2009) discovers a positive
influence of extension agents on the adoption decision. Also Nisrane et al. (2011), Ragasa
et al. (2013) and Krishnan and Patnam (2014) reveal positive and large effects on fertiliser
usage for the time since the launch of the PADETES programme until 2004 but barely any
impact afterwards (Nisrane et al., 2011; Krishnan and Patnam, 2014).
Common problems relating to fertiliser diffusion are seen in the fluctuation of prices
as well as uncertainties in production and consumption (Kassie et al., 2009; Dercon and
Christiaensen, 2011). However, Abrar et al. (2004) show that prices are not the major
obstacle to fertiliser diffusion. Instead, they suspect that it is the lack of the access to
fertiliser and credits that hinder diffusion (Abrar et al., 2004). The potential shortcomings
in access to fertiliser and credit have been counterbalanced by an massive increase in the
quantity of extension workers, who are responsible for the provision of credit and fertiliser,
besides agricultural training and other governmental tasks (Davis et al., 2010).
In general, the main problem is not seen in the efficiency of extension programmes but
in the low and gender biased participation (Davis et al., 2010; Ragasa et al., 2013). Low
participation levels may also explain the higher importance of neighbours for fertiliser adop-
tion observed by Krishnan and Patnam (2014) as the propensity to adopt does not depend
solely on the contact with the agent but on the perceived usefulness of their advices (Ra-
gasa et al., 2013). Even though, low quality recommendations and missing consideration
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of indigenous knowledge have been cited as weak points of extension service (Kassa, 2003;
Davis et al., 2010), farmers perception may be biased due to the cultural, i.e. ethnic or
religious, background of the responsible advisor. Abebe et al. (2016) provide empirical ev-
idence for the works by De Weerdt (2002) or Munshi (2014) and show farmers preference
to collaborate with ethnic or religious adherents. On the one hand, norms and values that
are shared by cultural allies, allow the establishment of trust and provide a common sense
which can facilitate cooperation (Platteau, 1994; Fafchamps, 2006; Karlan et al., 2009). On
the other hand, common norms in rural societies can oblige individuals to act against their
own interests (Fehr et al., 1997; Platteau, 2009), like the cultural constraint of using micro-
credits in certain parts of Ethiopia (Davis et al., 2010). Hence, the participation in and the
perceived usefulness of the extension programme may be subject to a cultural bias if the
ethnic or religious background of the agent does not fit the prevailing norms of the rural
society. A cultural mismatch is not unlikely as Ethiopia is home to more than 80 ethnic
groups (Census, 2007), and intermixing across ethnic territories occurs frequently (Bekele
and Drake, 2003). Besides conflicting ethnic norms, language barriers may appear as each
ethnic group inherits its own tongue, leading to language distinctions even between areas
that are just a short distance apart, especially in the multi-ethnic Southern Nations, Nation-
alities, and Peoples Region. Thus, linguistic obstacles can impede the development of trust
due to communication gap and simultaneously lacking information and knowledge exchange
(Breuer and McDermott, 2012).
The presented literature does not distinguish between the first adoption and repeated
adoptions. Hence, the performance of extension agents is measured independently from
farmers’ prior knowledge and experiences about fertiliser usage. Yet, prior experiences in-
fluence personal attitudes towards available technology and the perceived value of exten-
sion agent recommendations. Even the best advice may fail if unpredictable environmental
circumstances prevent fertiliser to augment yields and impairs the reputation of the devel-
opment agent. Thus, the mixed results and vanishing importance of extension service for
fertiliser adoption may be partially attributed to the impure adoption definition besides pre-
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viously mentioned factors. Therefore, the following sections will investigate the performance
of extension service programmes among inexperienced farmers.
3 Data
3.1 Data selection
The paper uses a sub-sample of seven Peasant Association (PA)3 and 643 households from
the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) which originally covers 1477 rural households
in 15 Peasant Association between 1994 and 20094. The selection reflects the necessity
to consider prevalent diffusion levels5 in order to properly analyse the effect of extension
services. As seen in the first column of Table 1 fertiliser dissemination among all PAs reveals
substantial differences in diffusion levels for the survey baseline year 1994. While the villages
in the lower section of Table 1 barely show a proper initialization of the diffusion process,
fertiliser was used at least once by more than 60% of households in villages from the upper
section of Table 1. In addition, the villages have disparities with respect to their chronological
starting points as seen in column 2.
3Namely the Peasant Associations Adado, Dinki, Doma, Geblen, Haresaw, Imdibir and Shumsheha.
4The questionnaire of the 2009 round of the survey lacks the specific questions about extension service
participation between 2004 and 2009 and the information is not identifiable in the raw data. Hence, the last
survey round is excluded from the analysis.
5Hereby, the diffusion of fertiliser presents the share of households within a society, that have applied
fertilisers at least once. The author is aware that the initial adoption of fertiliser does not imply a persistent
usage and that the decision to apply fertiliser occurs repeatedly over time which results in a fluctuation of
fertiliser application rates between years.
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Table 1: Fertiliser Diffusion across Peasant Associations
Pesant Association Diffusion Level in 1994 First Adoption (Year) Diffusion Level by 2009
M
at
ur
e
Ad
op
te
r
Aze Deboa 98.67 1964 100
Trirufe Ketchema 94.12 1958 99.01
Gara Godo 91.97 1965 98.95
Sirba na Goditi 89.69 1958 92.78
Debre Berhan 89.13 1964 97.28
Yetmen 86.88 1977 91.80
Koro Degaga 70.64 1977 96.33
Adele Keke 61.85 1965 89.69
La
te
Bl
oo
m
er
s Dinki 12.64 1984 60.91Haresaw 9.52 1989 80.95
Doma 5.4 1994 67.56
Geblen 4.54 1992 40.90
Shumsheha 0.67 1994 28.37
Imdibir 0 1995 35.82
Adado 0 1996 14.61
Source: Author’s calculations based on ERHS.
Note: The diffusion levels express the percentual share of fertiliser adopters per village. Columns 2&4
include adoptions occurred in 1994&2009. Column 3 presents the year of first fertiliser adoption in each PA.
These initial differences in fertiliser diffusion suggest to not analyse the performance of
extension service among all PAs. On the one hand, precise information about extension
service participation before 1994 is missing, makes it impossible to link the first adoption of
fertiliser to the presence of extension service in the years prior the launch of the survey. On
the other hand, fertiliser usage after 1994 in villages with high diffusion levels may not be
solely attributed to the extension service but also to the prevalent knowledge and experience
about fertiliser usage in the local environment like shown by Krishnan and Patnam (2014).
Thus, the analysis will focus on households without access to prior experience about fertiliser
in the local environment6.
However, understanding the vast differences in diffusion levels in 1994 and the time gaps
of fertiliser start off is useful as these outcomes may be based on systematic dissimilarity of
key variables. Hence, the PAs are split into two groups, namely mature adopters and late
bloomers, to track down the causes. The group labels are inspired by Rogers (2003) adopter
6Even though there where few cases of fertiliser being adopted in Dinki, Haresaw and Geblen before
1994, they are marginal in numbers and should have a negligible impact on the shareable mindset of these
PAs.
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categories7 and Figure 1 illustrates the reason for complying with his classification. Notably,
a huge chronological gap appears between the first overall adoption in 1958 and the take up in
fertiliser usage among the late bloomers. A comparison between the blue and dark red lines
reveals the hampering effect of delayed fertiliser diffusion by the late bloomer group on the
overall fertiliser diffusion. The late bloomers face their first adoption not until the diffusion
among mature adopters already reached more than 46% and the vast majority of adoptions
takes even place when fertiliser diffusion among the mature adopters already reaches the
theoretical tipping point of the diffusion curve. The corresponding adopter categories show
that households that appear locally as Innovators or Early Adopters among the late bloomers
would mainly represent the Late Majority or Laggards in the mature adopter group (except
for the first adopters in Dinki).
Figure 1: Year of First Adoption by PA and Diffusion of fertiliser
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Source: Author’s calculations based on ERHS and applied on the adopter categorization by Rogers (2003).
Note: The x-axis depicts years when fertiliser usage started in each PA (See also Table 1). The blue curve
illustrates the total fertiliser diffusion of all PA, the dark red curve considers only PAs that start adoption
prior 1984 and the dark yellow curve depicts diffusion for PAs with adoption initialization in 1984.
7Rogers (2003) classifies the categories based on the standard deviations from the average time of adop-
tion. As we deal with censoring and not complete adoption, our categorization relies on diffusion levels.
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Interestingly, the time gap of 26 years between initial adoption in both groups checked
against the time gap resulting from the final diffusion level of late bloomers (47.02%)
matched at its equivalent on the mature adopter diffusion curve (in 1984/1985), reveals
only a marginal decrease of 1.5 years (26 years vs. 24.5 years). In other words, late bloomers
did not substantially catch up or benefit from their late fertiliser uptake, suggesting missing
spillovers from national fertiliser diffusion to local dissemination.
The comparison of selected household specific variables, known to be influential factors
for agricultural technology diffusion by Feder et al. (1985), between mature adopters and
late bloomers in Table 2 reveal an expected pattern.
Table 2: Comparison of adoption determinants by Adopter Categories
Mature
Adopter
Late
Bloomer
Late Bloomer
Adado Dinki Doma Geblen Haresaw Imdibir Shumsheha
Plot Size (ha) 1.53 0.76 0.39 1.17 1.14 0.22 0.47 0.11 1.47
Soil Quality 1.7 1.85 1.59 1.87 1.11 2.83 2.44 1.78 1.87
Crop Variety 2.57 2.01 1.55 1.79 1.57 1.12 1.3 2.98 3.09
Distance (km) 8.12 10.29 7 11 3 18 16 5 12
Source: Author’s calculations based on ERHS
Note: The comparison presents mean values of adoption determinants in the baseline year 1994. Soil
Quality ranges from to one to three with value 1 as indicator for good soil and value 3 for poor soil. Crop
variety refers to the average number of different crops on household plots and the distance is measured
between village and market.
Mature adopters have on average larger plots with better soil quality while farming a
larger variety of crops and facing shorter distance to markets8. Geblen in particular suffers
from the worst local conditions with the largest distance to market, the worst soil quality
and the penultimate farm sizes. Nevertheless, Geblen begins fertiliser adoption earlier than
relatively more advantageous villages like Adado, Doma, Imdibir or Shumsheha.
At first glance, understanding why certain villages of the late bloomer group reveal
chronological differences in initiating the fertiliser diffusion process cannot be exclusively
8Since values in Table 2 correspond to 1994 as reference year, all indicators, apart from distance to
market, may be erroneous due to fertiliser uptake before 1994.
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justified by comparing the feasibility of some adoption indicators. Considering the polit-
ical and environmental circumstances in Ethiopia, two additional explanations should be
highlighted. After the fall of the monarchy in 1974 and the establishment of a military
dictatorship, the Derg treated northern Ethiopian areas as enemies. According to the sup-
plementary village studies of the ERHS, Geblen and Haresaw were facing a civil war under
the Derg regime (1974-1991) that: “[...] heavily devastated the area economically and eco-
logically, and socially compounded the natural calamities.” (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996b).
Beside the social insecurity, the notorious famine of 1984 caused the resettlement of house-
holds in many areas and the PA of Doma just emerged due to the migration of households
from the drought-affected Gamo highlands in 1985 (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996a). Thus,
households of these three PAs were prevented from using fertiliser due to civil war or the
harsh living conditions that caused resettlement9. In turn, the historical political and envi-
ronmental conditions fail to fully explain the low diffusion levels in Dinki and Shumsheha or
the total absence of fertiliser usage in Adado and Imdibir in 199410.
3.2 Extension service among late bloomers
For the purpose of counteracting soil degeneration and promoting food stability in rural
societies, extension service programmes aim to introduce modern inputs such as fertiliser
and new agricultural practices. Extension service agents are present in each of the late
blooming PAs. The data allows us to track extension service participation between 1994
and 2004 for the SG2000 and PADETES programmes. During that period, 166 out of 643
households adopted fertiliser and almost 50% of adopters had had previous contact with
the extension service program. Considering that only 18% of households have had contact
with the extension service, 71.55% of these farmers started using fertiliser in the same year.
Figure 2 presents the extension service correspondence and subsequent adoption. While
9In order to avoid bias from migration, we correct for migration history and do not consider fertiliser
adoption prior to land ownership.
10Droughts and other weather shocks were severe in any of the 15 PA’s of the ERHS and all suffered to
various degrees from the Derg regime. However, fertiliser application took place in most locations and only
Doma, Geblen and Haresaw seem to be thwarted by the political situation in this particular context.
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correspondence varies, impact appears to be quite positive for the majority of villages. Only
households in Imdibir do not respond to the incentives given by extension agents.
Analysing supplementary data from the ERHS does not reveal systematic differences
between PAs in terms of their understanding and acknowledgement of extension work. In
all villages, the vast majority perceives the extension service as source of modern inputs
and new cultural practices. Nonetheless, Appendix Figure 4 also shows a reasonable share of
missing awareness about the activities of extension agents for peasants in Adado, Geblen and
Imdibir. The lack of awareness might explain the low participation shares seen in Figure 2.
Further reasons to not participate may originate from the design of the programmes
which require a down payment and sufficient land size. Most farmers indicate one of both as
the main barrier to participate (see Appendix Figure 5). Surprisingly, peasants in Imdibir
neither perceive their small plot sizes nor the down payment as a main obstacle to joining
the program. Instead they do not specify the main reason.
In what follows, we will consider these aspects to properly estimate the impact of the
extension service on fertiliser adoption among the selected villages.
Figure 2: Contact with extension service and fertiliser adoption conditional on contact
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Source: Author’s calculations based on ERHS.
Note: Share of households by village that have been in contact with the extension service between 1994
and 2004 (left) and share of fertiliser adoptions in same time period conditional on the contact to extension
agents (right).
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4 Methodology
4.1 Estimation strategy
Participation in an extension service programme or the seeking of advice from the extension
agent suffers from self-selection bias, if more feasible farmers in terms of wealth, education
and skills have higher odds of getting into contact with the development agent (Dercon et al.,
2009). The probability of selection-bias is relatively high for the present data as extension
agents require the achievement of a minimum adoption quota and therefore may target
farmers with, a priori, superior conditions for adopting (Kassa, 2003). Thus, estimating the
impact of the extension service on fertiliser adoption demands adjustment as treated and
non-treated farmers are assumed to behave differently even in the absence of the treatment.
In an optimal scenario, we would like to measure the average treatment effect on the treated
group:
ATT = E [ Y T − Y C | T ] (1)
with Y T as adoption of fertiliser (outcome variable) if treated and Y C if not treated, under
the condition that all farmers belong to treatment group T. Clearly, it is impossible to
observe E [ Y C | T ]. The problem is known as the unobservable counterfactual (Holland,
1986), i.e. how would the treated farmer behave in the absence of the treatment. Common
approaches to encounter the issue are matching techniques. The basic idea is to create
an artificial counterfactual by selecting farmers from the observed non-treated group which
share the largest common overlap with treated farmers with respect to known determinants
of the outcome variable and the assignment to treatment. Ideally, the artificial counterfactual
group is (almost) identical in observable variables to the treated farmers. This case would
eliminate the selection bias as treated and control units coincide in their pre-treatment
attributes and allows the estimation of the ATT defined as follows:
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ATT = E [ Y T | T, X ]− E [ Y C | C, X ] (2)
where X is the vector of covariates known to influence the outcome variable or the assignment
to treatment.
4.2 Matching Frontier
The common technique for estimating ATT by using a matching procedure is propensity score
matching which is widely applied across various fields of research. However, propensity score
matching, like other matching techniques, suffers from the trade-off to optimize either the
imbalance between treated and control group to reduce model dependence and bias on the
one hand or keeping a sufficiently large sample size to restrain the variance of the estimate on
the other hand. So far, joint optimization of sample size and balance has occurred manually
as present matching techniques could only optimize one or the other. The recent approach
of matching frontier by King et al. (2016) disentangles the trade-off between imbalance and
variance by automatic and simultaneous optimization of sample size and balance (King et al.,
2016).
To achieve the simultaneous optimization, matching frontier uses a greedy algorithm to
encounter the high computational complexity. Their greedy algorithm is an iterative process
that stepwise prunes observations with the maximum distance from the overlap area while
considering an updated distance calculation at each iteration. The outcome is the matching
frontier presenting all optimal matched sample subsets along the imbalance-variance trade-
off, i.e. each matched subset provides the minimal imbalance given the number of pruned
observations11. The precise algorithm for achieving the matching frontier depends, inter
alia, on the choice of the imbalance metric. We will apply two different imbalance metrics in
combination with two different sets for pruning to investigate the consistency of the ATT.
The first parameter set to construct the matching frontier uses the discrete L1 imbal-
11King et al. (2016) proof the optimality of their algorithm as pruning does not affect the nearest matched
unit(s). See King et al. (2016) for the full proof.
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ance metric. The L1 processes differences between treated and control units as bins of a
multivariate histogram (King et al., 2016). The L1 is defined as follows:
L1(H) =
1
2
∑
(v1...vk)∈H
|tv1...vk − cv1...vk | (3)
with v1...vk as the range of covariates of the multivariate histogram and with the relative
proportions12 of treated (tv1...vk) and control (cv1...vk) units by covariate. In combination with
the L1 metric no treated units will be pruned. Thus, the reduction in imbalance may appear
more challenging if treated units turn out to be very distinct from the controls and finding
suitable matches could become cumbersome. The optimal algorithm will iteratively prune
observations with the largest proportional distance between treated and control units unless
the imbalance metric is larger than in the previous repetition (King et al., 2016).
Contrary to the first set of parameters, the Average Mahalanobis Imbalance (AMI) metric
and pruning of treated observations defines the second specification. The AMI measures the
average of shortest distances between all units i of a sample and their nearest unit in the
opposite group by
D = meani
[
D(Xi, Xj(i))
]
(4)
with Xj(i) as defined as
Xj(i) = arg min
Xj |j∈{1−Ti}
[√
(Xi −Xj)S−1(Xi −Xj)
]
(5)
√
(Xi −Xj)S−1(Xi −Xj) presents the distance between the multi-dimensional vectors Xi
and Xj with S as covariance matrix (King et al., 2016).
Since the second specification allows pruning of unfeasible treated units, the estimation
will not present the ATT of the sample but the treatment effect on feasible observations and
it is crucial to interpret the estimate under consideration of matched sample characteristics,
12The proportions refer to the frequency of treated (control) units per stratum in relation to the entire
frequency of treated (control) units in the strata (King et al., 2016).
14
4 Methodology
i.e. one should take into account which kind of observations have been pruned and which
remain. The greedy matching algorithm would, starting from the full sample, match each
control observation to the nearest treatment observation and provide the shortest distance
for each match. Subsequently, the AMI calculates the average distance of all matches and
units with the largest minimum distance to their matched counterpart are removed. The
outcome is a reduced subset of the original data. If the reduced subset contains more than
two observations and an AMI greater than zero, the procedure repeats but starting from the
reduced subset until only two observations remain or the AMI becomes zero. The greedy
algorithm produces optimal results since re-matching would not decrease distance (King
et al., 2016).
After defining the estimation strategy and the matching frontier to estimate the ATT,
the following subsection will briefly describe the construction of the sample and provides
insights into the performance of the chosen matching techniques on the sample selection.
4.3 Sample selection
In order to estimate the impact of the extension service on fertiliser adoption, the sample is
split into treated and control groups according to household participation in the extension
service programme. Since the treatment status can be observed over the time period spanning
1994 to 2004, the sample splits treatment and control groups for each year. The control
group contains all households that never had contact with an extension agent throughout
this period. These households appear in the control group each year as long they do not
migrate or adopt fertiliser13. Additionally, households that receive treatment join the control
group in all years prior to the year of treatment, i.e. households with treatment in 1997
can be part of the control group in 1994, 1995, 1996. The treatment group comprises only
households that obtain an extension service in the same year. Once a household has been
treated, it cannot serve as control in successive rounds.
13Fertiliser adopters do not appear in the sample after the adoption took place as the concern of the work
is to evaluate determinants of the very first adoption and not to address the repeated confirmation of the
adoption decision.
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Moreover, to avoid spurious results, treated units are removed from the sample in the
years following their first treatment. In that way, households receiving repeated treatment
over time or adopting at a later date are just present in the year(s) before obtaining treat-
ment and in the year of treatment. The reasoning behind this is to avoid measurement error
as households being treated are systematically different from the control units due to the
treatment and their decision to adopt at a later stage may still be influenced by the treat-
ment received in a prior round. Equally, households receiving multiple treatments cannot
be matched properly after their first treatment as the repeated assignment to the treatment
group is not independent from the previous event in the sample. Hence, the impact estima-
tion is limited to measuring the immediate response of households to the extension service,
i.e. decision about fertiliser adoption of a household within the same year of receiving the
treatment.
The matching occurs taking into consideration variables that are known - in the litera-
ture - to affect the adoption and/or the selection into the treatment group as described by
Feder et al. (1985); Sunding and Zilberman (2001); Croppenstedt et al. (2003); Asfaw and
Admassie (2004); Dadi et al. (2004); Weir and Knight (2004); Carlsson et al. (2005); Knowler
and Bradshaw (2007); Duflo et al. (2011); Dercon and Christiaensen (2011); Krishnan and
Patnam (2014), in order to achieve a balanced sample with respect to the baseline char-
acteristics of treatment and control group. Since matching requires complete information,
pruning observations with missing values from original data reduce the number of observa-
tions to 643 unique households whereof 109 did receive treatment at a certain point in time
between 1994 and 2004. With these households two samples are built to exploit the available
observations and to circumvent information gaps of time variant variables during non survey
rounds.
The first sample is a full pooling sample of 4728 unmatched observations and covers
each year from 1994 to 2004. The full pooling sample contains non-survey years in order to
include all 109 treated households. However, the inclusion of non-survey years in the full
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pooling sample restricts matching on time invariant variables14. In order to exploit also time
variant variables a second sample of 1907 observations is built from the 1994, 1997, 1999
and 2004 survey rounds. This partial pooling sample allows to better match on potentially
decisive factors but cuts half the number of observed treated units from 109 to 54.
Table 3 presents the balance tests for the full pooling sample and the partial pooling
sample. Balance is achieved for matched subsets of 282 and 104 observations with the
L1 and AMI in the full pooling sample. The partial pooling sample presents balance for
subsets of 108 observations with both matching algorithms. A closer look on the unmatched
full pooling samples reveals significant differences between treated and control units for
household specific characteristics. Treated households have larger farm sizes, are mainly
male headed and have higher levels of literacy. Surprisingly, households experiencing a
worse environmental shock are more present in the treatment group. This observation is in
line with the analysis of Marmai (2016), showing the influence of extreme weather shocks on
innovative behaviour. However, both, the L1 and AMI, reduce the imbalance between treated
and control units to non-significant levels for the sub-samples drawn from the full data15.
The partial pooling contains a larger set of variables but limits the sample to the 1994, 1997,
1999 and 2004 survey rounds. The additional variables are missing in the full pooling sample
due to their unobservable specification during non-survey rounds. Besides being male and
facing an environmental shock, treated units are younger and own an oxen which is also
a crucial determinant of fertiliser adoption in Ethiopia (Dadi et al., 2004). Moreover, we
do not observe significant differences in access to treatment between members belonging to
the local religious or ethnic majority. The reason for including the membership indicator is
twofold. First, Bekele and Drake (2003) describes the insecurity in land tenure and resulting
shorter planning horizons of farmers belonging, locally, to the ethnic minority in Ethiopia.
They expect a positive correlation between the application of new conservation methods
14Farm size, literacy and sex are relatively time consistent but we account for potential changes. If it was
impossible to determine the status of a variable with certainty for the point in time, the observation was
excluded from the sample.
15The L1 suffers from keeping all treated households and is not able to completely remove the significant
differences in farm size.
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and the membership in the ethnic majority group. Against their hypothesis, members of
the ethnic majority do have a positive and significant correlation with the non application
of conservation techniques. The results of Bekele and Drake (2003) show that different
ethnic groups in the same area respond differently to new agricultural practices. Second, the
characteristics of extension agents are unobserved and we cannot account if agents cultural
background fit the local ethnic and religious environment. However, we assume agents to
belong to the ethnic majority of the area as the distribution of governmental extension
agents outside their home area could be counterproductive due to language barriers. Hence,
matching on the majority status should account for cultural differences between extension
agents and farmers. As hypothesized by Bekele and Drake (2003), the membership status
should also account for land security and access to information, which besides farm size,
includes off farm income and equb membership16, are important determinants of adoption
in Ethiopia (Bewket, 2007; Kassie et al., 2009; Abebaw and Haile, 2013).
Matching occurs also for village characteristics in order to check for potential differences in
supply and demand constraints. Distance to market measures the remoteness of a village and
hence the dependence on the extension agent to access fertiliser. The fractionalization index
for ethnicity and religion expresses the probability that two randomly drawn individuals do
not have the same religion or ethnicity (Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). It is a
measure for the diversity of the rural society and is taken into account as fragmented societies
are under suspicion of thwarting economic development due to lower provision of public
goods, conflict, coordination troubles and ethnic favourism (Horowitz, 1985; Easterly and
Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Franck and
Rainer, 2012). However, the combination of distance to market and both fractionalization
indices makes it possible to correctly identify the village and therefore to consider the socio-
environmental conditions for the matching process.
16Equb or iqub, are local types of rotating savings and credit associations.
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Table 3: Balancing tests for matched samples
Variable full pooling n = 4728 partial pooling n = 1907
Unmatched sample L1 AMI Unmatched sample L1 AMI
C T Diff
p.value
C T Diff
p.value
C T Diff
p.value
C T Diff
p.value
C T Diff
p.value
C T Diff
p.value
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Farm Size 0.99 1.27 0.0291 1.02 1.27 0.0919 0.71 0.91 0.2974 0.99 1.25 0.1827 1.05 1.25 0.4147 0.98 0.93 0.8235
Sex 0.73 0.87 0.0000 0.87 0.87 0.9753 0.77 0.79 0.8440 0.73 0.85 0.0178 0.85 0.85 1.0000 0.84 0.82 0.8502
Literacy 0.30 0.43 0.0110 0.44 0.43 0.7960 0.29 0.34 0.5743 0.31 0.41 0.1359 0.52 0.41 0.2465 0.51 0.46 0.6667
Shock 0.21 0.31 0.0260 0.31 0.31 0.9220 0.30 0.34 0.6870 0.23 0.37 0.0438 0.37 0.37 1.0000 0.49 0.46 0.8356
Soil Quality 1.78 1.77 0.9111 1.69 1.77 0.3892 1.99 1.88 0.5189 1.79 1.88 0.4481 1.94 1.88 0.6869 1.89 2.09 0.2195
Member Majority:
Ethnicity 0.91 0.89 0.4000 0.91 0.89 0.6379 0.98 0.97 0.7144 0.91 0.93 0.6946 0.98 0.93 0.1736 0.99 0.96 0.5436
Religion 0.73 0.72 0.7654 0.75 0.72 0.5114 0.79 0.79 0.9849 0.73 0.81 0.1202 0.78 0.81 0.6366 0.90 0.86 0.5725
Equb Member 0.15 0.20 0.3367 0.09 0.20 0.1063 0.11 0.14 0.6921
Age 48.14 43.39 0.0053 41.63 43.39 0.4356 43.01 42.64 0.8844
Remittance 0.11 0.06 0.1031 0.06 0.06 1.0000 0.04 0.07 0.5334
Off Farm Income 0.37 0.30 0.2408 0.41 0.30 0.2305 0.31 0.39 0.4586
Oxen Owned 0.23 0.43 0.0050 0.30 0.43 0.1638 0.24 0.29 0.6295
P
A
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
Diffusion 0.12 0.12 0.8996 0.11 0.12 0.6439 0.07 0.08 0.7433 0.10 0.09 0.2435 0.09 0.09 0.7526 0.04 0.04 0.6803
Distance to market 13.06 12.08 0.2011 12.98 12.08 0.3535 14.48 14.63 0.9247 13.03 12.76 0.7914 12.63 12.76 0.9284 13.91 14.25 0.8361
Fractionalization:
Ethnic 0.12 0.15 0.1925 0.13 0.15 0.5474 0.12 0.11 0.6617 0.12 0.13 0.9117 0.11 0.13 0.6390 0.09 0.10 0.6934
Religion 0.37 0.37 0.9728 0.35 0.37 0.4347 0.29 0.29 0.9998 0.37 0.33 0.2291 0.34 0.33 0.8195 0.31 0.28 0.6086
Source: Author’s calculations, based on ERHS and using the MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Bold p-value indicates differences are significant at a 10% level or lower. The balance achieved for the full pooling sample is given by matched subsets of 282 and 104 observations
for the L1 and AMI respectively. Balance for the partial pooling sample is given by subsets of 108 observations for both matching algorithms.
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5.1 Average impact of access to agricultural extension on fertiliser
adoption
Table 4 presents the estimated average effects of access to agricultural extension agents on
chemical fertiliser adoption. The results across both matching techniques and for both data
samples show positive and significant impacts on fertiliser adoption decision of households
without prior fertiliser usage. Farmers with contact to extension agents are roughly 60%
more likely to adopt fertiliser in the same year for the complete data sample. Considering
the reduced data sample but checking for a broader set of variables still reveals highly
significant results and a large average effect. The substantial size of the effect reveals the
importance of extension agents as sources of information and access to fertiliser for first-time
adopters. The focus on the initial adoption of a household makes it possible to identify the
pure impact of extension service as potential adopters cannot rely on their own experience
and depend mainly on the performance of the extension agent. The remarkable effect of the
analysis indicates that the extension service fulfils its function as gatekeeper and successfully
introduces fertiliser into a rather unaware and inexperienced environment.
By definition the ATT estimated by the L1 imbalance measure reveals the impact of
extension service on all treated units. In contrast, we allow pruning of infeasible treated ob-
servation for the AMI. The specification translate into the emission of 71 treated households
from the full pooling sample (38 of 109 treated households remain) and 26 treated households
from the partial pooling sample (28 of 54 treated households remain). The elimination of
treated households during the matching process makes it possible to remove the significant
unbalance in farm size, which did not vanish if the algorithm is forced to keep all treated
units.
Pruning treated households changes the average characteristics of the treatment group
and the ATT estimates on the AMI matched samples do not hold for pruned treated house-
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holds. Recalling the mean values after matching from Table 3, we can conclude for our two
AMI matched samples, that the ATT draws on households with farm sizes below one hectare
and large distances to market. The households almost entirely belong to the ethnic majority
and are more shock affected than pruned observations of the treatment group.
Table 4: Effect of the agricultural extension service on fertiliser adoption
Outcome Treatment variable: contact to extension service
full pooling partial pooling
L1 AMI L1 AMI
Fertiliser adoption 0.616∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.060) (0.071) (0.060)
Observations pre-Match 4728 1907
treated pre-Match 109 54
Observations post-Match 282 104 108 108
treated post-Match 109 38 54 28
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R
package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: According to King et al. (2016), our chosen specification of the AMI estimates the feasible sample
average treatment effect on the treated (FSATT) as pruning of treated units is allowed and the selected
specification of the L1 algorithm without pruning of treated observations estimates the sample average
treatment effect on the treated (SATT). To comply with literature we use the common expression, average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), for both cases. Significant results for ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
As shown in Table 3, significant differences between and treated and control units have
been removed for both samples independent of the matching algorithm. Figure 3 provides
further information about the quality of pruning. The balanced sub-samples from the full
pooling data sample portray the minimum distance achievable with both matching algo-
rithms. In both cases the matching algorithm stopped as no further reduction in distance
is possible, i.e. for full pooling: AMI = 0 and L1 = 0.16. Given the characteristics of the
matching frontier approach further pruning would not reduce imbalance.
In contrast, both sub-samples from the partial pooling sample are optimal and balanced
but do not present the lowest possible distance like the full pooling sub-samples due to the
broader scope of variables and the lower number of observations. However, the sub-sample
size of 108 observations is sufficient to remove significant differences between treated and
control units. Also, the distance between treatment and control group decreased remarkably
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from an AMI of 11.404 with zero pruning to 0.404 for the selected sub-sample and from 0.97
to 0.445 for the L117.
Figure 3: Performance of imbalance reduction algorithms
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R
package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Full pooling contains observations from every year between 1994 and 2004 but is limited to time
invariant variables and variables with the possibility to calculate values for non-survey rounds, e.g. sex,
farm size etc. Partial pooling uses observations from the ERHS 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2004 rounds and
explores a broader set of variables.
5.2 Robustness check
In order to inspect the robustness of the estimated ATT, the matching procedure has been
iterated for each year of the time period across all villages to analyse annual variations and
17Minimum distance achievable is zero for the AMI but requires pruning down to two observations and a
L1 distance of 0.428 for a sub-sample with more treated than control units.
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to observe local differences relating to each village18.
Results for the annual variations, seen in Table 5, display the consistency of the effect
over time. The largest impact coincides with the liberalisation and deregulation of fertiliser
markets and prices in 1998 (Abrar et al., 2004). Notably the reported fade out of the effect
in our sample begins as early as 200319 and not only after 2004 as shown by Krishnan
and Patnam (2014). The lower impact in 2003 and the absence of the effect in 2004 do
not stringently indicate the redundancy of the extension service due to increased awareness
about fertiliser diffusion. While the extension service is mainly not present in villages with
advanced fertiliser diffusion after 2000, 55.56% of treatments occur in villages with low
diffusion levels. Moreover, Table 6 and Table 7 reveal that the reduction of impact mostly
reflects the poor extension performance in two villages in particular.
Extension service properly works in Doma, Dinki, Haresaw and Shumsheha for full and
partial pooling samples. The magnitude of the effect in these villages is partially larger than
the main effect indicating a poorer performance in Adado, Geblen and Imdibir. Indeed,
extension service fails to convince farmers to adopt fertiliser in the same year of the treat-
ment in Geblen and Imdibir for each sample. In Adado, a positive and substantial effect
is measurable for the full pooling sample. However, the impact vanishes for the reduced
sample but cannot be attributed to the wider set of control variables in that sub-sample as
accidentally no one of the three treated households in has adopted while five of six treated
households have adopted in the years between the survey rounds.
The observed results have to be taken with caution. In particular, results from Table 7
may suffer from the low number of remaining treated households. However, as the direction
and magnitude of the effect does not differ in all but one village between Table 6 and Table 7,
we are confident about the impact of the extension service on fertiliser adoption in each
village.
18All results depend on selected sub-samples that achieve a complete balance between treatment and
control group.
19The effect was not measurable since no household received treatment in 2001 and not a single household
adopted fertiliser for the first time in 2002.
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Table 5: Effect of the agricultural extension service on fertiliser adoption by year
Outcome Treatment variable: contact to extension service
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI
Fertiliser adoption 0.545∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.087) (0.097) (0.080) (0.054) (0.046) (0.062) (0.099) (0.028) (0.058)
Observations pre-Match 630 502 483 458 389
treated pre-Match 22 15 6 22 14
Observations post-Match 51 51 63 64 83 83 80 79 200 58
treated post-Match 22 17 15 12 6 5 22 17 14 13
Outcome Treatment variable: contact to extension service
1999 2000 2003 2004
L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI
Fertiliser adoption 0.800∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.006
(0.043) (0.081) (0.061) (0.086) (0.074) (0.052) (0.040) (0.039)
Observations pre-Match 399 340 315 337
treated pre-Match 5 8 4 4
Observations post-Match 92 91 77 77 85 86 159 171
treated post-Match 5 5 8 8 4 3 4 4
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Estimations not possible in the years 2001 and 2002 due to lack of treatment or adoption observations. The variables applied in each group have been presented in Table 3. The
ERHS 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2004 rounds exploit the broader set of variables. Significant results for ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6: Effect of the agricultural extension service on fertiliser adoption by village (full pooling)
Outcome Treatment variable: contact to extension service
Adado Dinki Doma Geblen Haresaw Imdibir Shumsheha
L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI
Fertiliser adoption 0.556∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ −0.060 −0.015 0.800∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.025 0.809∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.072) (0.074) (0.080) (0.075) (0.091) (0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.056) (0.079) (0.055) (0.058)
Observations pre-Match 1086 590 388 483 544 597 1040
treated pre-Match 9 15 31 7 25 4 18
Observations post-Match 87 87 79 79 75 75 74 74 87 87 85 85 101 101
treated post-Match 9 7 15 14 31 22 7 7 25 19 4 4 18 15
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Significant results for ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 7: Effect of the agricultural extension service on fertiliser adoption by village (partial pooling)
Outcome Treatment variable: contact to extension service
Adado Dinki Doma Geblen Haresaw Imdibir Shumsheha
L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI L1 AMI
Fertiliser adoption −0.013 −0.017 0.667∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.036 0.664∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.020 0.979∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.076) (0.071) (0.097) (0.067) (0.068) (0.115) (0.094) (0.093) (0.085) (0.069) (0.082) (0.056) (0.090)
Observations pre-Match 429 232 166 198 220 243 419
treated pre-Match 3 6 12 4 19 3 7
Observations post-Match 78 78 52 52 55 55 60 60 60 56 73 53 54 54
treated post-Match 3 3 6 4 12 11 4 4 19 15 3 3 7 5
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Significant results for ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5.3 Impact heterogeneity
The missing impact on fertiliser adoption in Geblen and Imdibir requires further investiga-
tion to understand potential barriers to the extension service system. Notably, Geblen and
Imdibir record the lowest number of treated households among all villages. Since we neither
observe the supply of extension service, i.e. agents availability, nor the demand or willingness
of farmers to get in contact with agents, we can only judge the selection of treated units.
In Geblen, out of our sample 10 households20 adopted fertiliser between 1994 and 2004
and seven households had contact with extension agents during the same period. Recalling
Table 3, the major differences between treated and control units are observable for farm size,
sex, literacy, shock, age and oxen ownership. In Geblen, predominantly men belonging to an
ethnic and religious majority have contact with the extension agent (see Table 8). Treated
farmers seem to be younger and have a higher level of literacy. Farm size, soil quality and the
weather shock indicator do consistently differ on average between treated and control units.
Interestingly, Tigrawain farmers (= ethnic majority) receive treatment but do not adopt
while 60% of the adopters belong to the Saho minority ethnic group. This observation may
imply a cultural selection bias of the extension agent towards the Tigrawain people or the
lack of interest by Saho to cooperate with the extension agent. Potential reasons may stem
from the unobserved ethnicity of the extension agent. Since Geblen is located in the Tigray
Region and Ethiopia is ruled by an Tigrawain government it is not impossible to imagine
the appointment of mainly Tigrawain agents in that area and hence a potential favourism
of the own ethnic group appears simply in order to avoid language barriers.
20Recall the construction of the data sample. Households that receive treatment in one year are not
represented in subsequent years as we measure only the direct impact of extension service on the adoption
decision. Hence, the sample contains only 10 out of 14 adoptions.
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Table 8: Pre-Balance between treated and control by year for Geblen
Variable Year of treatment
1994 1995 1997 2004
C T C T C T C T
Fertiliser adoption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
Farm Size 0.24 0.25 0.40 0.19 0.34 0.56 0.38 0.50
Sex 0.56 1.00 0.57 0.67 0.53 1.00 0.44 1.00
Literacy 0.10 1.00 0.09 0.33 0.08 0.50 0.15 1.00
Shock 0.73 1.00 0.53 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Soil Quality 2.78 3.00 2.75 2.67 2.50 3.00 2.75 2.00
Member Majority:
Ethnicity 0.66 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.67 1.00
Religion 0.79 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.83 1.00
Equb Member 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 53.31 37.00 56.61 43.50 56.94 67.00
Remittance 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.64 1.00
Off Farm Income 0.81 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.53 0.00
Oxen Ownership 0.02 0.00 0.71 1.00 0.44 1.00
Family Size 5.42 5.00 4.86 10.00
Trust 4.58 5.00
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R
package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Bold values indicate differences are significant at a 10% level or lower. Means in difference tests
cannot be performed for 1994 and 2004 as each year contains only one treated observation.
To understand the direction of potential discrimination, further comparisons between
treated households and Saho people, Tigrawai and Saho people as well as all non-treated
households can be found in the Appendix Table 10. The comparisons reveal the following
observations21. Saho people are by no means constantly worse than Tigrawai people in their
pre-conditions for receiving treatment. Saho own slightly larger farms than Tigrawai farmers,
have similar levels of literacy and soil quality, but household heads of Saho are somewhat
older and families comprise on average almost one person more. Among all Tigrawai people
the most feasible farmers received treatment, i.e. young farmers with relatively larger plots,
higher literacy and oxen ownership. The comparison of treated farmers and Saho does not
reveal a consistent superiority apart from the literacy. However, treated households are
few in numbers and Saho farmers with identical attributes to treated Tigrawains could be
21The proposed explanations should be read with a great deal of caution as the comparisons suffer from
the low number of treated observations.
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selected. The selection towards treatment took place for farmers with suitable conditions to
adopt fertiliser but unilateral selection of Tigrawains might not be by chance as the presence
of ethnic blinkers cannot be determined with certainty. Inversely, generalized trust of Saho
people is not significantly lower and cannot indicate a potential unwillingness to participate
in the extension service.
Final comparisons of adopter and treated units shows partially larger farm sizes and a
higher literacy by treated households (see Appendix Table 11). Adopters did not suffer from
a weather shock in the year of adoption while treated households did face a weather shock
at the same year. Since we cannot observe the exact point in time of the weather shock
we do not know if the treatment occurs as a reaction to the shock. Interestingly, adopters
of fertiliser differ partially in contrasting directions from their ethnic peers (see Appendix
Table 12). While Saho adopters are the oldest farmers with the largest farms and the highest
literacy, Tigrawain adopter are the youngest farmers with the smallest plots and the worst
literacy. Both ethnic adopter groups neither earn off-farm income nor receive remittances
but own oxen.
To sum up, the general selection mechanism in Geblen cannot be criticised based on
the available data as treated units exhibit feasible economic pre-treatment characteristics
to adopt fertiliser. Though a taste of discrimination either from Saho people towards the
extension service or vice versa may stick. In addition, potential discrimination may also
be present towards women as Ragasa et al. (2013) notice. In spite of the missing impact
of extension service on adoption in the same year, sources for the general low participation
should also briefly be mentioned. Appendix Table 5 reveals the shortage of land and cash
as main barriers to participate in programme between 1994 and 1999 in Geblen. However,
the presented tables in the preceding paragraphs do not indicate superior pre-conditions
for treated households in comparison to untreated with respect to farm size and income.
A potential explanation for the low participation may be due to the limited availability of
agents, as farmers in Geblen face the largest distance to market of all villages and agents
may not show up regularly.
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Imdibir, on the contrary, is only 5km away from the closest market. Yet, the village
has the fewest adopter and extension service participants for the period being investigated.
Moreover, the participation in extension service does not spur adoption. Pre-Balance com-
parisons between treated and controls in Table 9 does not reveal a consistent superiority of
economic characteristics of treated households. Only farm sizes of treated households are
substantially larger in 2003 and 2004. Notably, all treated farmers are men. Comparing
fertiliser adopter to treated households and in general to non-adopter in Table 13 does not
reveal significant differences for these groups. Since the economic variables available do not
contribute to an understanding of the low participation and the missing impact a closer look
certain distinctive socio-cultural attributes of Imdibir and its inhabitants may provide an
answer.
Table 9: Pre-Balance between treated and control by year for Imdibir
Variable Year of treatment
1994 2003 2004
C T C T C T
Fertiliser adoption 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
Farm Size 0.15 0.09 0.24 0.44 0.24 0.38
Sex 0.86 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.69 1.00
Literacy 0.37 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.36 0.00
Shock 0.39 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Soil Quality 1.74 1.00 1.98 1.76 1.96 2.22
Member Majority:
Religion 0.48 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.53 0.50
Equb Member 0.68 1.00 0.67 0.50
Age 49.23 35.00 56.41 60.00
Remittance 0.11 0.00 0.92 1.00
Off Farm Income 0.61 1.00 0.47 0.00
Oxen Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Family Size 7.59 8.00 5.35 6.50
Trust 3.69 4.00
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS. Calculations have been performed by the R
package MatchingFrontier by King et al. (2014).
Note: Bold values indicate differences are significant at a 10% level or lower. Means in difference tests
cannot be performed for 1994 and 2003 as each year contains only one treated observations.
Unlike in Geblen, economic barriers have not been stated as main reason for non-
participation (see Appendix Table 5). Instead, almost 50% of the peasants in Imdibir call
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the unspecified factor “Other” as a reason for rejecting participation. One interpretation
of the factor “Other” could be the common low level of trust. In a comparison of different
trust dimensions between all villages in Appendix Table 14, inhabitants of Imdibir present
the poorest trust towards other in all categories. While the minor trust in people and neigh-
bours is at least close to a neutral value, i.e. neither agree nor disagree to trust, the attitude
towards the Ethiopian government and their local kebele government is illustrated by large
mistrust and complicates the mission of the extension agents as governmental servants.
Also Bevan and Pankhurst (1996c) observe the suspiciousness of Gurage people (ethnic
group of Imdibir) towards local outsiders. The Gurage community maintains close bonds
and refuses to report any financial information due to fear of tax collection (Bevan and
Pankhurst, 1996c). The strong reliance on cultural traditions creates a common identity but
can be an obstacle to foreigners with a different background to achieve acceptance by the
community as firstly described by Wellin (1955). Hence, the work of extension agents may
be hampered by a missing acceptance of the rural society and low willingness to collaborate
due to the deficit in trust. Another barrier could stem from the broad dimension of religious
beliefs in the Gurage society. This variety comes along with numerous holy days every month
preventing farmers from work on their plots and limit potential visits of extension agents
especially if the agents suspend work on other days due to religious mismatch.
A final note on the selection in both villages concerns the tendency to treat mainly
younger farmers. Koutsou et al. (2014) show that younger farmers have lower levels of trust
to people and are less innovative. Indeed, for the limited number of observations young
farmers present lower levels of trust. Thus, fertiliser adoption may be hampered due to the
missing trust of young farmers in the extension worker. The line of thoughts receives support
by Abebe et al. (2016), revealing that older farmers using middlemen for trading purposes
are more frequent.
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6 Conclusion
The paper provides additional evidence for the importance of extension services programmes
to the discussion about their efficiency. The performance of the extension service is estimated
in the context of a late blooming environment, i.e. in contrast to other works, we consider
only the first fertiliser usage as an adoption and focus on households in villages with low
fertiliser diffusion during the time of the study launch in 1994. The restriction of the adoption
definition implies that the household has never employed fertiliser before and hence cannot
rely on previous personal experience during the adoption decision process. Our aim is to
avoid spurious measurement of the extension service impact, as repeated fertiliser adoption
of households over time potentially depends to a diminishing degree on extension service but
may substituted by neighbours or own experiences.
Our results confirm the expected impact of the extension service on the first fertiliser
adoption and prove their importance to introduce new ideas, raise awareness and foster
adoption. The effect appears to be relatively constant over time but differs between villages.
While the impact is large in magnitude for farmers in Dinki, Doma, Haresaw and Shumsheha,
extension agents fail to immediately spur adoption in Geblen and Imdibir.
Attempts to explain the poor performance in both villages additionally raise the ques-
tion about the generally low participation rates in these PA. Since we cannot observe the
frequency and duration of extension agents visits in each village, inadequate supply provides
a (non-testable) explanation. On the demand side, peasants in Imdibir reveal exceptionally
low levels of trust in local and national authorities. The lack of trust may impede an ap-
propriate collaboration and potentially explains the low participation levels as well as the
missing impact on adoption. On the contrary, several farmers in Geblen adopt fertiliser but
none of them due to extension service. The shortage of impact could not be explained by
observable economic or social variables.
Hence, further research is required to evaluate the described channels as the proposed
explanations suffer from missing data.
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Appendix
Figure 4: Most important activities of Extension Workers between 1994 - 1999
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Figure 5: Reason to not participate Extension Service between 1994 - 1999
0
25
50
75
100
Ad
ad
o
Din
ki
Do
ma
Ge
ble
n
Ha
res
aw
Im
dib
ir
Sh
um
she
ha
Sh
ar
e 
(%
)
Reason
Shortage of land
Shortage of cash for down payment
Other
Failed to repay previous loans
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS.
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Table 10: Differences between Saho and Tigrawai people in Geblen
Variable Year of treatment
1994 1995 1997 2004
Saho Tigrawai Saho Tigrawai Saho Tigrawai Saho Tigrawai
all treated non-
treated
all treated non-
treated
all treated non-
treated
all treated non-
treated
Fertiliser adoption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Farm Size 0.30 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.45 0.36 0.19 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.56 0.34 0.46 0.35 0.50 0.35
Sex 0.71 0.50 1.00 0.49 0.68 0.51 0.67 0.50 0.63 0.50 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.44 1.00 0.42
Literacy 0.10 0.12 1.00 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.33 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.50 0.06 0.17 0.18 1.00 0.15
Shock 0.62 0.79 1.00 0.78 0.79 0.41 0.67 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Soil Quality 2.86 2.75 3.00 2.74 2.74 2.75 2.67 2.75 2.48 2.54 3.00 2.51 2.76 2.71 2.00 2.74
Equb Member 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 57.43 50.86 37.00 51.20 59.89 54.00 43.50 54.66 56.67 57.48 67.00 57.08
Remittance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.67 0.64 1.00 0.62
Off Farm Income 0.81 0.81 1.00 0.80 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.67 0.44 0.00 0.46
Oxen Ownership 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.71 1.00 0.69 0.33 0.52 1.00 0.50
Family Size 5.86 5.19 5.00 5.20 5.50 4.76 10.00 4.54
Trust 4.50 4.64 5.00 4.62
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS.
Note: Bold values indicate differences are significant at a 10% level or lower in respect to the Saho value. Means in difference tests cannot be performed for column Tigrawai treated in
1994 and 2004 as each year contains only one treated observation.
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Table 11: Comparison of Adopter and Treated in Geblen
Variable 1997 All years
Adopter Treated Means
difference
test
(p-value)
Adopter Treated Means
difference
test
(p-value)
Farm Size 0.35 0.56 0.0927 0.33 0.35 0.8425
Sex 0.62 1.00 0.0796 0.70 0.86 0.4643
Literacy 0.12 0.50 0.5880 0.10 0.57 0.0662
Shock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.0781
Soil Quality 2.00 3.00 0.0185 2.20 2.71 0.1569
Equb Member 0.00 0.00
Age 57.50 43.50 0.0221
Remittance 0.00 0.00
Off Farm Income 0.12 0.00 0.3506
Oxen Ownership 0.75 1.00 0.1705
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS.
Note: Bold values indicate differences are significant at a 10% level or lower. 1997 is the only year in which
treated units and adopters are observed. However, no adopter received treatment and no treated household
adopted in the same year.
Table 12: Comparison of Adopter by Ethnicity for Geblen
Variable Tigrawai Saho
Adopter Non-
Adopter
Means
difference
test
(p-value)
Adopter Non-
Adopter
Means
difference
test
(p-value)
Farm Size 0.23 0.30 0.3059 0.40 0.33 0.2813
Sex 0.67 0.46 0.6011 0.67 0.61 0.7940
Literacy 0.00 0.13 0.0000 0.17 0.11 0.7732
Shock 0.00 0.29 0.0000 0.00 0.25 0.0000
Soil Quality 2.00 2.70 0.3515 2.17 2.77 0.1919
Equb Member 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 53.33 54.49 0.8890 63.00 57.82 0.4568
Remittance 0.00 0.14 0.0000 0.00 0.15 0.0021
Off Farm Income 0.33 0.51 0.6540 0.00 0.52 0.0000
Oxen Ownership 0.67 0.46 0.6011 0.83 0.41 0.0517
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS.
Note: Bold values indicate differences are significant at a 10% level or lower. Adoption mainly occurred in
1997 and 1999. Another adoption in 2003 has not been considered in the table to exploit a broader range
of variables.
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Table 13: Comparison of Adopter and Treated in Imdibir
Variable Treated vs. Adopter Adopter vs. Non-Adopter
Treated Adopter Means
difference
test
(p-value)
Adopter Non-Adopter Means
difference
test
(p-value)
Farm Size 0.32 0.32 0.9527 0.32 0.25 0.4630
Sex 1.00 0.60 0.1778 0.60 0.78 0.5143
Literacy 0.25 0.30 0.8809 0.30 0.37 0.7480
Shock 0.25 0.20 0.8809 0.20 0.28 0.7263
Soil Quality 1.80 1.82 0.9637 1.82 1.81 0.9807
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS.
Note: Bold values indicate differences are significant at a 10% level or lower. Adoption observed in 1995,
1997, 2003, 2004. Treatment observed in 1994, 2003, 2004.
Table 14: Trust across Peasant Associations
Trust in: Village
Adado Dinki Doma Geblen Haresaw Imdibir Shumsheha
People 4.79 5.15 4.75 4.64 5.04 3.58 4.45
Neighbours 5.48 5.62 5.32 5.00 5.27 4.25 5.18
Government 4.49 4.24 5.18 4.56 4.97 2.55 4.72
Kebele 4.14 4.04 4.57 4.46 4.74 2.73 4.50
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the ERHS.
Note: Trust measure base on a 7-point Likert scale. Higher values report stronger approval towards the
trust statement. Value 1 corresponds to “Strongly disagree” and the value 7 corresponds to “Strongly
agree”. The Kebele represents the lowest level of local government.
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